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Abstract. We present an alternative formulation of the two-person equal area
bargaining solution based on a dynamical process describing the disagreement
point set. This alternative formulation provides an interpretation of the idea
of equal concessions. Furthermore, it leads to an axiomatic characterization
of the solution.
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1. Introduction
One way to compare the axiomatic approaches to the two-person bargaining
problem since Nash (1950) can be based on the following question: On which
feasible points, beside the disagreement point, should a bargaining solution
depend? The Nash bargaining solution depends only on a small neighborhood
of the solution point, more precisely, on the slope of the Pareto optimal set
at the solution point. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) criticized the Nash bar-
gaining solution exactly for that reason; they axiomatized a solution proposed
earlier by Rai¨a (1953), which depends also on the utopia point. Perles and
Maschler (1981) proposed and characterized the so-called Super-Additive so-
lution, which depends on the whole Pareto optimal boundary. Another solu-
tion which depends on the whole boundary ± and thus on the whole feasible
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applies, naturally.set ± is the so-called Equal Area solution. This solution picks the Pareto op-
timal point where the area of the individually rational part of the feasible set
above the solution point is equal to the area to the right of that point. It has
many standard properties occurring in axiomatic bargaining theory. The in-
tuition for it ± that the players should make equal concessions (e.g., Anbarci
and Bigelow, 1994) ± can be justi®ed by interpreting equal area as equal con-
cessions. The main axiom in a characterization by Anbarci and Bigelow
(1994), Area Monotonicity, is based exactly on the idea of area representing
concessions. Anbarci (1993) characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in a
noncooperative game where the two players alternate in proposing and veto-
ing alternatives from a ®nite set; taking the limit of the resulting alternative in
going from the ®nite to the in®nite setting then reproduces the Equal Area
solution outcome. Apart from the fact that it is not obvious that alternative
vetoing in a ®nite setting is a reasonable procedure ± this will depend on the
description of the alternatives ± again the limit process assumes, rather than
explains, that area represents concessions.
In this paper we present an alternative formulation of the Equal Area
solution which ± we hope ± sheds additional light on the possibly underlying
bargaining process, and helps the reader in deciding whether and when this
solution concept is appropriate. The basic idea is simple enough: instead of
considering the integral (area) we look at the underlying dynamical process
that is integrated. This process has to do with the proportion of the utility
concessions made by the players and therefore might be intuitively more
appealing.
To ®x ideas, let the set S in R2 be the convex hull of the points 0;0,
1;0, 0;1, and 1;0:7. See Figure 1. With the origin as disagreement out-
come, this is one of the sets used in Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) to criticize
the Nash bargaining solution; according to this solution player 2 obtains only
0:7i nS and player 1 obtains his maximal utility. The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution assigns the point 10=13;10=13 to S. One can argue, however, that
at this point player 1 `gives up' more alternatives than player 2, in view of
the bulk of alternatives to the right of this point. The Equal Area solution
better re¯ects this, because it assigns the outcome 11=14;107=140 to S, and
11=14 > 10=13. In fact, one interpretation of the results of the present paper is
to view the Equal Area solution as an adaptation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
Fig. 1. The set S and the two-step process
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the players' gains (10=13 : 10=13) to the proportion of concessions from the
`utopia point' (1 ÿ 10=13 : 1 ÿ 10=13). Suppose an impartial arbitrator
proposes the outcome 10=13;10=13 on this ground. Even if the players sub-
scribe to the principle, they might want to check whether they would reach
this outcome also in a gradual process based on the same idea of equal gains
and concessions proportions. Such a gradual process takes more data of the
bargaining problem into consideration. For simplicity, consider a two step
process where at the end of the ®rst step the players agree on the outcome
1=2;1=2 as the new disagreement point; indeed, at this point the proportion
of gains 1=2 : 1=2 is equal to the proportion of concessions 1 ÿ 10=13 :
1 ÿ 10=13. At the point 1=2;1=2, however, the utopia point has changed to
1;17=20. From this utopia point the proportion of losses with respect to the
proposed outcome 10=13;10=13 is equal to 1 ÿ 10=13 : 17=20 ÿ 10=13.
If the proportion of gains from 1=2;1=2 on is to be equal to this, i.e., to
60 : 21 instead of 1 : 1, then the players will not end up at the point
10=13;10=13 (see Figure 1). Consequently, in this two step process focussed
on the outcome 10=13;10=13 this outcome would not be reached.
Another way to look at this is to assume that the proposal 10=13;10=13
of an arbitrator will be accepted with some probability p. E¨ectively, the
expected agreement point will be p10=13;10=13. In a next step from this
expected agreement point, however, the outcome 10=13;10=13 will not be
reached if we adhere to the principle of equal gains and losses proportions
because the utopia point has changed.
Instead of such a discrete process, we will consider the corresponding
continuous process where the players make similar but in®nitesimally small
steps. The question then arises: Can we ®nd an outcome such that the corre-
sponding path of intermediate (dis)agreements would actually converge to this
outcome? The answer is a½rmative: Such an outcome is the one prescribed by
the Equal Area bargaining solution.
The attractiveness of this bargaining process and, in this respect, of the
Equal Area solution, depends on two crucial assumptions underlying it: the
principle of equality of gain and concession proportions, and the de®nition of
the latter based on a ®xed agreement point. An argument in favor of the ®rst
assumption is that these proportions represent an implicit comparison between
the players, based on the data of the bargaining problem ± in a symmetric
problem for instance they would typically be equal to 1, and that they should
be independent of whether gains or losses (concessions) are concerned. The
second assumption re¯ects a view on the bargaining process as a check on the
plausibility of a proposed outcome; such an outcome should be con®rmed
with the aid of the described process. This view is not an exceptional one. For
instance, suppose, alternatively, that the players would adhere to an equally
weighted egalitarian-utilitarian principle in the bargaining process; then the
unique ®xed point would be the Nash bargaining solution. The analogy is
close, and the importance of such a description for the Nash bargaining solu-
tion clearly appears for instance from the fact that its extensions to NTU-
games are based on it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model and
the Equal Area solution are introduced. Section 3 presents the formal de-
scription of the dynamical process and relates it to the Equal Area solution. In
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based on the dynamical process. Section 5 concludes with discussion, related
results for the Continuous Rai¨a and the Perles-Maschler solutions, and pos-
sible extensions.
2. Preliminaries. The equal area solution
A( two-person bargaining) problem is a pair S;d, where
(i) S is a convex subset of R2,
(ii) S is comprehensive: for all x A S and y A R2,i fyUx then y A S,
(iii) Sx :fy A S : yVxg is compact for every x A S,
(iv) d A S, where S denotes the interior of S.
These conditions are fairly standard in bargaining game theory. A set S sat-
isfying (i)±(iii) is called a feasible set,a n dd is called disagreement point.
For every x  x1;x2 A S, where S is a feasible set, let the point U Sx A
R2 be de®ned by





i xj : maxfyi : y y1; y2 A S and yj  xjg
for i; j A f1;2g, i0 j. The function U S assigns to each point of S the corre-
sponding utopia point. If no confusion is likely to arise we usually drop the
superscript S in these notations.
By B we denote the collection of all two-person bargaining problems.
A( bargaining) solution is a map F : B ! R2 with FS;d A S for every
S;d A B. Let
PS :f x A S : Ey A R2yVx; y0x ) y B Sg
denote the Pareto optimal set of a feasible set S. The Equal Area solution EA
assigns to each S;d A B the point z A PS such that the area of the set
fx A Sd : x2 Vz2g equals the area of the set fx A Sd : x1 Vz1g. Formally,







It is straightforward to check that equation (1) determines a unique point
PS C z > d. In particular, the Equal Area solution is well-de®ned.
Observe that a feasible set S has a unique Pareto optimal point p if, and
only if, S is rectangular, i.e., S f x A R2 : xU pg. In that case, EAS;dp
independent of d.I fS is not rectangular, then EAS;d is always a point
in the relative interior of the Pareto optimal set, that is, the Pareto optimal
set without its two endpoints. We denote this set by PS. Thus, EAS;d A
PS if S is not rectangular.
84 E. Calvo, H. PetersFor a solution F, a feasible set S, and a point z A S, de®ne by
DS;z;F :f d A S : FS;dzg
the disagreement point set of S with respect to z and F. This is the set of dis-
agreement points that, under F, would give rise to the solution outcome z.
If S is rectangular, say S f x A R2 : xU pg, then DS;z;EAq for all
z0 p, whereas DS; p;EAS. In all other cases the following lemma
applies.
Lemma 2.1. Let S be a nonrectangular feasible set. Then
(i) DS;z;EA0qif, and only if, z A PS.
(ii) Let z A PS. Then there exists a strictly increasing di¨erentiable function
f : ÿy;z1! ÿ y;z2 such that
DS;z;EAf  t; ft A R2 : ÿy < t < z1g:
Proof: (i) is obvious. For (ii), de®ne the function G : ft;s A R2 : t < z1;








By (1), DS;z;EAf  t;s A R2 : t < z1;s < z2;Gt;s0g. This implicitly
de®nes the function f as in (ii), and it is straightforward to verify that this
function is strictly increasing. Furthermore, the function G is di¨erentiable
because it has continuous partial derivatives with respect to t and s, namely
z2 ÿ u2t and u1sÿz1, respectively. These derivatives never vanish in the
domain of G, hence di¨erentiability of f is implied by the implicit function
theorem. r
Lemma 2.1 says that for a nonrectangular feasible set any disagreement point
set with respect to the Equal Area solution is the graph of a strictly increasing
and di¨erentiable function. This property of the Equal Area solution will be
used in the axiomatic characterization in Section 4 below.
3. Dynamics of the equal area solution
In this section we formally study the dynamical process as introduced in Sec-
tion 1, and relate it to the Equal Area solution. Let S be a nonrectangular
feasible set. Let z A PS and de®ne a vector ®eld on S by
S C x 7! Uxÿz: 2
An integral curve of this vector ®eld or, equivalently, a solution of the di¨er-
ential equation
x0  Uxÿz 3
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x0tUxt ÿ z for all t A I (0 denotes derivative). Such an integral curve
describes a trajectory of the dynamical process (3). For the interpretation of
this process see the example in Section 1.
We ®rst show that through each point of S there is a unique integral curve
of (2), or, equivalently, a unique solution of (3) for each initial condition.
Lemma 3.1. Let x0 A S. There is an a A R, a > 0 and a unique solution
x : ÿa;a!S of (3) satisfying the initial condition x0x0.
Proof: This lemma follows from a fundamental result in the theory of ordi-
nary di¨erential equations, see (e.g.) Theorem 1 in Chapter 8 of Hirsch and
Smale (1974). To apply this theorem, it is su½cient to prove that the map
x 7! Uxÿz is locally Lipschitz on S. Let x A S and let e > 0 so small that
y A S for all y A R2 with x1 ÿ eU y1 Ux1  e and x2 ÿ eU y2 Ux2  e.B y
taking the L1-norm on R2, it is su½cient to prove that the functions u2 and u1
are Lipschitz continuous on the intervals x1 ÿ e;x1  e and x2 ÿ e;x2  e,
respectively. Both functions are nonincreasing and concave on their respective
intervals, and have ®nite left derivatives at x1  e and x2  e, with absolute
values say K2 and K1, respectively. Then concavity and nonincreasingness of
u2 and u1 imply
ju2sÿu2tj=js ÿ tjUK2 for all s;t A x1 ÿ e;x1  e; s0t
and
ju1sÿu1tj=js ÿ tjUK1 for all s;t A x2 ÿ e;x2  e; s0t:
Hence, u2 and u1 are Lipschitz continuous. r
It is of interest to note that the above proof is the only place where convexity
of a feasible set is used in our study of the Equal Area solution. Hence, ev-
erything would go through if, instead of convexity of the feasible set, Lipschitz
continuity of the functions u1 and u2 would be required.
We are interested in integral curves or trajectories of the dynamical process
(3) converging to the point z. This is the subject of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.
(i) Let x : a;b!S be a solution of (3) with lim t!b xtz. Then
EAS;xt  z for all t A a;b.
(ii) Conversely, the set DS;z;EA is the graph of a solution of (3).
Proof: (i) Observe that, for all t A a;b, we must have xt < z because
x1^ tVz1 or x2^ tVz2 for some ^ t A a;b would imply that x2t or, respec-
tively, x1t decreases for tV ^ t by de®nition of the dynamical process (3), in







ÿ  u1x2t ÿ z1u2x1t ÿ z2; 4







ÿ  u1x2t ÿ z1u2x1t ÿ z2; 5
where the second equalities in (4) and (5) follow because x is a solution of (3).







where C is a constant of integration. Because limt!b xtz, both integrals in
this equation converge to 0 as t converges to b, which implies C  0. By (1),
this completes the proof of part (i).
(ii) The proof of this part is basically by reversing the proof of part (i). Let
x : I ! S, where I is some real interval, describe the set DS;z;EA (cf.











This implies that xt (or a positive multiple) is a solution to (3). r
Thus, Theorem 3.2 establishes that the disagreement point set of the Equal
Area solution is the unique solution of (3) converging to the point z, as already
announced in Section 1.
4. Axiomatics of the equal area solution
In this section we present an axiomatic characterization of the Equal Area
solution based on the dynamical process of the preceding section and, in par-
ticular, on the idea of equality of gain and concession proportions. In contrast
with the dynamical process however this axiomatic characterization does not
depend on the idea of a ®xed point and thus adds to the mere dynamical
description.
Let F : B ! R2 be a bargaining solution. We call F regular if FS;dp
for all rectangular problems of the form S f x A R2;xU pg and if for all
nonrectangular S;d A B
(i) FS;d A SnS,
(ii) FS;dVd,
(iii) DS;FS;d;FWfFS;dg is connected and DS;FS;d;F is the
graph of a di¨erentiable function I ! S, where I HR is an open
interval.
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means that the disagreement point set converges to the solution outcome and
is smooth and ``thin''. The latter can be interpreted as sensitivity with respect
to changes in the disagreement point.
The Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are regular on the domain of
bargaining problems with smooth boundaries. Other regular solutions will be
discussed in the next section.
By its de®nition and by Lemma 2.1 the Equal Area solution is regular.
Next, we formulate two additional properties for a solution F : B ! R2.
Independence of NonIndividually Rational outcomes, INIR: For all S;d;
T;d A B with Sd  Td we have FS;dFT;d.
For a set S HR2, denote by
compS :f x A R2 : xU y for some y A Sg
the comprehensive hull of S.
Constant Proportional Concessions, CPC: Let S;d A B nonrectangular with
S  compSd. Then, for all xUd,
x A DS;FS;d;F,d ÿ x  aU SdÿFS;d for some aV0:
The INIR condition was ®rst introduced in Peters (1986a), see also Peters and
van Damme (1991). It says that the solution outcome should only depend on
the individually rational part of the bargaining problem. The CPC condition
implies that if the disagreement point is decreased in such a way that (i) the
corresponding utopia point does not change, (ii) the decrease is proportional
to the concession vector, connecting the utopia point to the solution point,
then the solution outcome itself does not change, i.e., the disagreement point
remains in the same disagreement point set. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
We show that these two properties together with regularity characterize the
Equal Area solution.
Theorem 4.1. A solution F : B ! R2 is regular and satis®es INIR and CPC if,
and only if, F is the Equal Area solution.
Fig. 2. The constant proportional concessions property
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forward, and also CPC can easily be checked by the de®nition of EA.
Conversely, let F be a regular solution satisfying INIR and CPC. Take
S;d A B. We have to show that FS;dEAS;d. In view of regularity
of F we may assume that S is nonrectangular, and in view of INIR of F and
EA we may assume that S  compSd. In order to show that FS;d
EAS;d it is, by Theorem 3.2 and regularity of F, su½cient to show that
DS;FS;d;F has a vector of tangency at the point d that is propor-
tional to the vector U SdÿFS;d. Take an xUd such that d ÿ x 
aU SdÿFS;d for some a > 0. Then by CPC the line segment from x
to d is part of the disagreement point set DS;FS;d;F. By regularity of F,
hence smoothness of DS;FS;d;F, d ÿ x is a vector of tangency at the
point d. r
It is not hard to see that, within the class of regular solutions, the two con-
ditions INIR and CPC are independent. Call a feasible set S nonlevel if
PSSnS. Denote by N the Nash bargaining solution, i.e., it maximizes
the product x1 ÿ d1x2 ÿ d2 on Sd, for each S;d A B. De®ne the solution
~ F by
~ FS;d :
NS;d if S is nonlevel and has a smooth boundary
EAS;d otherwise

for all S;d A B. ~ F is a regular solution satisfying CPC ± because this con-
dition only applies to problems for which ~ F coincides with the Equal Area
Solution ± but not INIR.
The solution assigning the boundary point z with z1 ÿ d1  z2 ÿ d2 to each
nonrectangular S;d A B, and assigning the unique Pareto optimal point to
each rectangular problem is a regular solution satisfying INIR but not CPC.
Finally, we mention that our characterization of the Equal Area solution
can be modi®ed by weakening the regularity condition in the sense of requiring
``thinness'' only in case the boundary of S is smooth at the solution point, and
at the same time adding a weak continuity condition, e.g. Pareto continuity as
in Peters (1986b). The corresponding modi®cation of the proof of Theorem
4.1 is straightforward, and the advantage is that for instance the Nash bar-
gaining solution is not ruled out beforehand by the regularity condition.1
5. Discussion and extensions
The dynamical and related axiomatic approach as considered in this paper has
a (relatively) long history. Nash (1953) and Rai¨a (1953) studied so-called
arbitration games. Consider a bimatrix game and let the payo¨ pair of a
strategy combination played by the two players serve as disagreement point
in the cooperative payo¨ space. The cooperative payo¨ space contains the
payo¨s attainable if the players can correlate their strategies. By applying a
bargaining solution, the game is e¨ectively transformed into a strictly com-
petitive game, which may have a value. The existence of such a value depends
1 This point was suggested by one of the referees.
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tion, in particular (set) convexity. See also Luce and Rai¨a (1957) and Tijs
and Jansen (1982).
A weaker property than convexity of disagreement point sets was used by
Peters and van Damme (1991) in an axiomatization of the Nash bargaining
solution. Another characterization of the same solution by a similar approach
was obtained by Chun and Thomson (1990a). Proportional solutions were
characterized in Chun and Thomson (1990b). See also Furth (1990).
Some interesting bargaining solutions are de®ned only through their dis-
agreement point sets (or through a corresponding di¨erential equation). An
early example is the so-called Continuous Rai¨a solution (Rai¨a, 1953),
which was ®rst axiomatized by Livne (1989) and, independently, by Peters and
van Damme (1991). In fact, this solution denoted CR is de®ned by replacing
the di¨erential equation (3) for the Equal Area solution by the following
equation:
x0  Uxÿx: 6
Thus, also the Continuous Rai¨a solution is characterized by equality of gains
and concession proportions, with the latter de®ned with respect to the current
disagreement outcome rather than a ®xed Pareto optimal outcome. The cor-
responding axiom is the following. Cf. Figure 3.
CR-CPC: Let S;d A B with S  compSd. Then, for all xUd,
x A DS;FS;d;F,d ÿ x  aU Sdÿd for some aV0:
The proof of the following result is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.1 and
is therefore left to the reader.
Theorem 5.1. A solution F : B ! R2 is regular and satis®es INIR and CR-
CPC if, and only if, F is the continuous Rai¨a solution.
It can be observed that also the Continuous Rai¨a solution is an `equal area'
solution, but now the area has to be measured above and to the right of the
disagreement point curves, i.e., the solutions of (6). Also, it is not di½cult to
extend the de®nition of the Continuous Rai¨a solution and Theorem 5.1 to
the n-person case.
Fig. 3. The CR-CPC axiom
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ment point sets is the Super-Additive solution of Perles and Maschler (1981).
This idea was used by Calvo and Gutie Ârrez (1994) to extend the solution to
more than two bargainers. We will now describe the dynamical system and
corresponding axiomatization for the 2-person case but these can be extended
to the n-person case. Consider the class B0 HB of bargaining problems with
smooth and nonlevel boundary. That is, for a feasible set S, uS
1 and uS
2 are
di¨erentiable functions and PSSnS. The di¨erential equation for the
Perles-Maschler solution (cf. Perles and Maschler, 1981, or Calvo and












Although perhaps not immediately obvious, also the Perles-Maschler solution
determined by this di¨erential equation measures concessions in terms of area
below the Pareto surface. This will become more transparent from the for-
mulation of the characterizing axiom. First we de®ne for S;d A B0 the linear
extension of Sd, denoted by leSd, as follows. Let l and m be the straight lines
supporting S at the points d1;u2d1 and u1d2;d2, respectively. Then
leSd : Sd Wfx A R2 : x below l;x1 Ud1g
Wfx A R2 : x below m;x2 Ud2g:
The constant proportional concession axiom for the Perles-Maschler solution
is as follows. Cf. Figure 4.
PM-CPC: Let S;d A B0 with S  leSd. Then, for all xUd,
x A DS;FS;d;F,d ÿ x  aU SxÿU Sd for some aV0:
Observe that in Figure 4 the areas of the two small triangles are equal.
The proof of the following theorem is again left to the reader.
Theorem 5.2. A solution F : B0 ! R2 is regular and satis®es INIR and PM-
CPC if, and only if, F is the Perles-Maschler solution.
Fig. 4. The PM-CPC axiom
Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution 91With respect to the main topic of this paper, the Equal Area solution, the
following additional questions may be of interest. First, can the dynamical
process in (3) be used to extend the Equal Area solution to n-person bargain-
ing problems with n > 2? Although many results appear to go through, it is
not clear whether such an extension would lead to a single-valued solution.
More precisely, it is not clear whether integral curves of vector ®elds corre-
sponding, as in (2), to two di¨erent points z and ^ z can or cannot cross through
the same disagreement point d, in case of more than two dimensions. Second,
instead of considering gradual gains one could consider gradual losses by
constructing a `utopia path' while keeping the vector of gains z ÿ d ®xed,
where z is on the boundary of the feasible set and d changes with changing
utopia point. This would lead to equalizing the areas above the Pareto
boundary bounded by the utopia point.
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